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Abstract 
 
 University research parks constitute a potentially important mechanism for 
university technology transfer and regional economic development.  Unfortunately, there 
is little theoretical and empirical evidence on the firm-level choice decision to locate on 
such a facility.  We fill this gap by outlining and testing a theoretical model of this 
selection process.  Our empirical results suggest that firms locating on university research 
park are more research active and more diversified than observationally equivalent firms. 
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I.  Introduction 
University research parks were established to stimulate to facilitate technology 
transfer and the creation, growth, and development of high technology firms.  
Universities support research parks in order to enhance their prestige, secure additional 
funding from the private sector, generate rental income, ensure that university research is 
more relevant to industry, and to provide job opportunities for students and post-docs.  
Government provides financial support for university research parks because they view 
such institutions as a mechanism for generating technological spillovers and employment 
growth 
Unfortunately, there has been little theoretical or empirical analysis of the firm-
level choice decision to locate on such a facility.  The purpose of this paper is to fill this 
gap.  Specifically, we outline a theoretical model of this selection process, which we test 
using the population of public-traded firm who report positive R&D expenditures.   
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Section II, we provide 
background information on university research parks.  Section III outlines the theoretical 
model.  In Section IV, we present empirical results.  The final section contains caveats, 
preliminary conclusions, and a brief discussion of the economic and managerial 
implications of our findings. 
 
II. Background Information on University Research Parks  
In recent decades, we have witnessed substantial growth in the number of 
university research parks across the globe.  According to Link and Scott (2003)   there are 
81 active university research parks in the U.S.   The U.K. Science Park Association 
(UKSPA) reports that there are 100 science parks in the U.K., most of which are based on 
or near U.K. universities.   Phan, Siegel, and Wright (2005) identified over 200 science 
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parks in Asia , including 111 in Japan alone.  China has also been recently active in this 
arena.  
In the U.S., the formation of university research parks increased rapidly in the 
early 1980s due in large part to the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980, the R&E tax 
credit in 1981, and the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984.  This growth pattern 
in formations is similar across regions of the United States.  We also know that U.S. 
parks vary substantially in size.  For example, Research Triangle Park in North Carolina 
currently has 45,000 employees working on 7,000 acres and Colorado Bioscience Park in 
Aurora currently has 50 employees on 147 acres.  Of the population of 81 university 
research parks through 2002, 20 percent are focused exclusively  on biotechnology and 
17 percent are single focused on information technology.  Of the 39 U.S. university 
research parks in the planning stage at the end of 2002, 90 percent are located at state 
universities; 40 percent plan to focus on biotechnology; 30 percent are located at 
Carnegie Extensive universities; and over 50 percent of the provosts at planned parks 
state that the major reason for starting the park was related to regional economic 
development. 
Link and Scott (2006) report that U.S. science parks have changed the research 
environment at American universities.   They conducted an extensive survey of university 
provosts to assess the impact of these facilities.  The provosts report that since these parks 
have opened university research output (publications and patents) andextramural research 
have increased.  The university’s ability to hire eminent scholars and place doctoral 
students has remained about the same.  It also appears as science parks have resulted in 
the university curriculum has become more applied. 
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Unfortunately, there has been no systematic comparison of the research 
productivity of firms located on U.S. university research park firms and comparable non-
park firms.  The only authors conduct such an analysis were Siegel, Westhead, and 
Wright (2003), who constructed a longitudinal dataset containing information on the 
R&D inputs and outputs of firms located on and off university research parks in the 
United Kingdom.  The authors estimated an R&D production function and concluded that 
research park firms are more efficient than non-research park firms in research, in terms 
of generating new products and patents. 
However, there are some U.S. findings with respect to employment growth, which 
many observers believe is the best measure of park success.   Link and Link (2003) report 
that the employment growth of university research parks is greater the closer the park is 
to the university; is greater if the park is not operated/managed by the university; is the 
same whether the park’s university is state or private; and is less if there is an incubatory 
on the park. 
 
III. Modeling the Decision to Locate on a University Research Park   
We model the decision for a firm to join a university research park based on the 
economic theory of clubs.  That is, we conceptualize membership in the park in terms of 
an invitation from the ‘club’ to join the park.1  Based on this framework, we can 
determine the optimal size of a park, and then identify the factors that can induce a 
change in the optimal size of a park.  
The model is described as follows: Consider a university research park that acts as 
a private organization so that membership in the research park is the result of mutual 
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agreement between the existing park tenants including the university – ‘the club’ – and a 
potential new member firm.  Among the population of firms that are interested in joining 
the park, let each be characterized by the quality of its R&D, q.  Then, the population of 
such firms can be characterized by the distribution of q, .  )(qf
 
The decision to admit a new firm, the jth firm (discussed in the following section), into 
the park depends on the effect of that firm on the well being of the firms already in the 
park.  For simplicity, we assume that there is some “representative” firm already in the 
park so that the relevant decision rule is whether the prospective member increases the 
well being of the “representative” member.2
 
For the “representative” firm, hereafter the ith firm, the value of belonging to the park is 
the opportunity to engage in synergistic activities that can be used to increase its well 
being, defined to be profits in the output markets in which it participates.  Assume that 
the ith firm’s potential to engage in synergistic activities is linked to its ability to 
assimilate new knowledge, that is, to its absorptive capacity, A .  Assume also that ith 
firm’s absorptive capacity is a positive function of the quality of its R&D, .  Hence: iq
 
(1)   )( iqAA =
 
                                                                                                                                                              
1 This methodology parallels that of Hall, Link, and Scott (2003) to analyze whether a research joint 
venture invited a university to join as a research member.  See also, Leyden and Link (1999) for a similar 
analysis. 
2 If the decision is made by a simple majority vote of existing firms, the representative firm will be the one 
with the median view.  If the decision is made by a director based on some composite expectation of the 
effect on members, the representative firm may be some “average firm” (perhaps fictitious). 
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Assume also that the actual level of its synergistic activities, , depends not only on the 
number of other firms in the park and the quality of their R&D,
iS
3  but also on the order in 
which potential firms are invited to join the park (Sandler and Tschirhart 1980).4  Then, 
the level of synergy of the ith firm is a positive, though convex, function of the number of 
firms, , in the park: N
 
(2)  )())(|,( iii qAfNqSS ≤= q
 
such that, as shown in Figure 1: 
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The ith firm engages in synergistic activity to generate profits 
i
Π  in its output markets.  
Assume that such profits increase at a diminishing rate with the level of synergistic 
activity, .  Thus: iS
 
                                                     
3 The ability to engage in synergistic activities depends both on the quality of R&D of the firms with which 
the ith firm interacts and on the quality of the firm’s own R&D.   
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such that, as shown in Figure 2: 
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Given equation (2): 
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There are, of course, costs associated with belonging to a university research park.  
Assume that the cost to the ith firm from belonging to the park consists of a fixed 
                                                                                                                                                              
TP
4 In other words, the park will always admit the highest quality firm, among all interested firms, first. 
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component and a marginal component.  The fixed component is the ith firm’s proportional 
share of total park overhead , which includes such factors as the installation and 
maintenance of basic infrastructure and park administration.  The marginal component, 
which consists of advertising and marketing , physical maintenance of the park, and the 
cost of joint park activities, is assumed to increase at an accelerating rate with the number 
of firms in the park.   
 
Thus, the ith firm’s cost function can be written as: 
 
(12)  210 NccCi +=
 
and illustrated in Figure 4.  The marginal cost to the ith firm of from admitting a new firm 
into the park is therefore: 
 
(13) Nc
dN
dCi
12=  
 
and it is illustrated in Figure 5. 
 
Whether the ith firm is better off as a result of a new firm joining the park, and hence, 
whether the new firm is invited to join the park, depends on the size of the marginal 
profits to the ith firm,  
N
i
∂
Π∂ , with the new firm, compared to the marginal cost to the ith 
firm, 
dN
dCi , with the new firm.  Thus, the decision rule is:  
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Thus, the equilibrium number of firms in the park will be that number of firms, , that 
solves the i
*N
th firm’s objective function: 
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and this solution will be characterized by the first-order condition: 
 
(16)  
dN
dC
N
S
dS
d ii
i
i =
∂
∂Π  
 
Figure 6 provides the graphical representation of this problem and its solution.  
 
IV.  Empirical Analysis 
A key empirical implication of the theoretical model is that firm conducting 
higher quality research are more likely to locate on a university research park.  To test 
this hypothesis,  we identified the population of publicly-traded firms who reported non-
zero R&D expenditures, using the Compustat file.  We then determined whether these 
firms had a research facility located in one of the 81 operating U.S. university research 
parks as of 2002 – the year of the most recent data on the population of U.S. university 
research parks (Link and Scott 2006).  Our primary resource for mapping each Compustat 
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firm to a particular park was the park’s directory of tenants.  A secondary resource was 
Internet information regarding each company.  
The relative quality of a firm’s R&D is defined in two ways.  The first proxy is 
the level of R&D expenditure.  An alternative definition is the extent to which each firm 
is diversified in the output market.  We conjecture that R&D expenditure is an indicator 
of the company’s potential to generate research spillovers to other firms on the park and 
for the creation of a synergistic environment.  The extent to which each firm is diversified 
in the output market also proxies the probability of spillover and synergistic benefits from 
innovative investments to other park firms.5  Firm diversification is calculated from 
information in the Register of Corporations.  We use two alternative measures of 
diversification:  FD-the number of 4-digit industrial categories in which each firm reports 
sales and  WFD-the number of 4-digit industrial categories within each firm’s major 2-
digit industry in which each firm reports sales.6
 
The two equations we estimate are: 
(17)    Prob in a park = f (RD, FD, MANUF) 
(18)   Prob in a park = f (RD, WFD, MANUF) 
 
                                                     
5 Not only does this argument follow from our model, it follows from the rich literature about 
diversification and R&D activity.  See Nelson (1959), Link and Long (1981), Scott and Pascoe (1987), and 
Link and Scott (2002). 
6 FD is always greater than or equal to WFD. 
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where the first two independent variables are defined above and where MANUF if a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm’s primary industry is manufacturing, and 0 
otherwise.7   
Descriptive statistics for the variables included in the regression analysis are 
presented  in Table 1.  These figures reveal that 3.1% of the 2,435 Compustat firms 
reporting R&D expenditures in 2002 were located on a university research park.  Not 
surprisingly,  firms that conduct R&D are likely to be engaged in manufacturing 
activities.  
Table 2 presents Probit regression estimates of the marginal effects of each of the 
independent variables.  Note that in each variant of the model, the marginal effect of 
R&D expenditures is positive and significantly related to the probability that a firm will 
locate in a research park.  There is evidence that the R&D effect is non-linear, being 
positive to a level of R&D of nearly $4 billion.  However, fewer than one-half of one 
percent of American firms allocate that much money to R&D.  Thus, over what we 
consider the relevant range of R&D expenditures, our theoretical prediction holds.   
For both measures of diversification, the marginal effect is positive and 
significantly related to the probability that a firm will locate in a research park.  This 
finding also corresponds to our theoretical prediction.   Note that the above two 
conclusions hold whether a prospective firm is in the manufacturing sector or the service 
sector. 
 
V.  Conclusions 
                                                     
7 Gallaher, Link, and Petrusa (forthcoming) show that the nature of R&D varies significantly among firm in 
the manufacturing compared to those in the non-manufacturing sector. 
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The empirical analysis appears to confirm the predictions from our theoretical 
model.  Our findings also provide some strategic guidance to universities that are either 
recruiting firms to newly-established parks or to planned parks.  As a benchmark, 
universities with a limited ‘recruiting budget’ should focus on those firms that are 
relatively more R&D active and that are more highly diversified.  Note from Table 1 that 
only about 3 percent of the population of public R&D-active firms has a research facility 
located in a university research park.  Thus, the size of the potential population of firms 
to recruit to locate in a park is large.   
From the firm’s perspective the decision to locate on a university research park is 
dependent on its ability to realize innovation externalities from other members in the park 
including the university.  As such, decision makers should consider the scale, scope, and 
diversification of park members as well as the potential for new members before 
committing to a park location.  As noted above, of the 39 planned parks as of 2002, 40 
percent plan to focus specifically on biotechnology.  If this is indicative of a trend 
towards the adoption of a specific technology focus, then prospective university research 
park tenants should consider both the current and future state of research synergies. 
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Figure 1   
The Actual and Potential Level of Synergistic Activities by the ith Firm in the University 
Research Park 
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Figure 2   
The ith Firm’s Total Profits as a Function of University Research Park Size 
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Figure 3   
The ith Firm’s Marginal Profits as a Function of University Research Park Size 
 
N  
$ 
N
fNqS ii
∂
Π∂ )))(|,(( q
 
 
 15
Figure 4 
Total Cost to the ith Firm from its University Research Park Membership 
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Figure 5  
Cost to the ith Firm from Membership in the University Research Park 
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Figure 6 
The Optimal Number of Firms in a University Research Park 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for Variables Included in the Regression Analysis  (n=2,142) 
 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
InPark .031  
RD ($mil) 117.9  
FD 2.42  
WFD 1.55  
Manuf 0.73  
 
Note:  The sample of firms was reduced from the 2,435 Compustat firms because many were not listed in 
the Register of Corporations, from which the diversification information was obtained.
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Table 2 
Marginal Effects of Variables in Equation (17) from Probit Estimates  
(standard errors in parentheses, n=2142) 
 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
RD .000046 
(.000007)* 
 
.00016 
(.000018)* 
.00004 
(.000007)* 
.00015 
(.000018)* 
RD2 -- -2.12 E-8 
(2.99 E-9)* 
 
-- -1.95 E-8 
(2.98 E-9)* 
FD .0037 
(.0012)* 
 
.0019 
(*.0012)*** 
-- -- 
WFD -- -- .016 
(.0028)* 
 
.012 
(.0028)* 
MANUF -.0050 
(.0083) 
 
-0.0077 
(.0082) 
-0.0068 
(.0082) 
-.0095 
(.0082) 
Log Likelihood -275.21 -264.84 -268.69 -260.29 
Note: * = significant at the .01-level; ** = significant at the .05-level; *** = significant at the .10-level.   
In other specifications MANUF was deleted and replaced with 2-digit dummies.  The marginal effects 
of the reported variables were unaffected.  These results are available upon request. 
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